Multi-Agency working and safeguarding adults in care Essay Example

Multi-Agency working and safeguarding adults in care Essay There have been various cases recently in the news to where abuse has been either suspected of confirmed, for example the Panorama undercover programme at Winterbourne view whereby a range of physical, emotional, psychological abuse were identified. Abuse is defined as A violation of an individuals human and civil rights by any other person or persons. Vulnerable people are more open to abuse due to the individuals either not being able to stand up for themselves and are usually unwell, frail or/and confused. Different types of services try to combat this abuse through taking a multi-agency approach whereby the organisations all work together to discover ways of preventing the abuse from taking place in the beginning or resurrect the situation when abuse has been confirmed by providing a range of support through support planning and single assessment. Rather than the organisations working separately and providing separate services without any communication, multi-agency working encourages the services to work together through sharing information and a co-ordination of approach whereby the individuals needs are central to the process and that a person centred care approach is used. With multi-agency working there will be an array of professionals from different agencies where they will combine each of their individual skills and expertise to meet all of the individuals holistic needs. We will write a custom essay sample on Multi-Agency working and safeguarding adults in care specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Multi-Agency working and safeguarding adults in care specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Multi-Agency working and safeguarding adults in care specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer For Multi-agency working to be successful, good communication from all organisations and a good understanding of what each other do is crucial. Not only this but it also requires a co-ordinating professional, to ensure that the organisations are working to satisfactory levels and that the needs of the individual are being met. Another benefit is that through multi-agency working, it is encouraged for the individual to have involvement in their health care services and allows them to feel more confident in talking about their worries, fears and potential abuse. Not only this but having equality through the relationships of the working encourage the individual to develop a higher self-esteem, self-confidence and the strength to stop accepting the abusive situations that may occur are the norm. It also ensures that there is an agreed approach to all of the organisations which are involved including the families and informal carers as well so that they are all aware of and can monitor the situation. Multi-agency working is also a way of enabling better information sharing and communication in terms of the staff, team meetings, communication via emails and written records such as in a care home whereby there would be a daily log which enables each staff coming on shift to be able aware of events that had taken place since they were last on duty. With the multi-agency approach they believe that the sharing of information and concern will conclude to early preventive action on abuse to take place and that patterns of behaviour can be identified of the service users when different members of staff come on to duty which could suggest that abuse is taken place by that worker. Forums are another way in which multi agency works (monthly meetings of residents in care services) where by the individuals are encouraged to share ideas and speak out giving the individuals more confidence to speak out and have a greater ownership and independence in terms of decisions that affect their lives such as being involved in interviewing new care staff. Not only this but it is also a chance for the service users to understand what procedures and guidelines that the care service has and their own rights emphasised to increase their expectations of the individual care that they receive. When the service users are clear on the guidelines they are more understanding on the what the behaviour of the staff should be, so not only are these guidelines are for the use of the staff but they are also for the service user to know what is acceptable behaviour from the staff and what is not. This is why the complaints procedure should be understood by all service users of the health facility and should be able to gain access to by all even if support is needed from an advocate from outside the organisation when making a complaint. So that there is a guarantee that all the staff members understand new procedures and policies, training needs to be implemented. Each new staff that works at the service also will require a formal induction whereby all of these policies and procedures are explained thoroughly, which will then underline their expected behaviour and practice in the service. Without training taking place, abuse is more likely to happen because of the poor practice and the workers lack of understanding of the policies and procedures. To prevent this from taking place and to ensure that the services are working with the best interest of the service user and following the rules and regulations that apply to each of them an independent regulator of health and social care services was established but shortly taken over by The Care Quality Commission previously help by the Commission for Social Care Inspection, the Healthcare Commission and the Mental Health Commission in April 2009 (stretch et al, 2010). Procedures laid down by the organisation in conjunction to the multi-agency framework should be followed in terms of cases of alleged or suspected abuse and include six stages including alerting the worker who has the responsibility of dealing with these situations to then for them to refer the allegation to the police or social services who will feedback after investigation and an Adult Protection Case Conference will share results of the investigation with the vulnerable persons family who is the subject of abuse. An assessment is then carried out and a review of a Protection Plan to make sure that the individuals needs are met in the future which will then be monitored and recorded. If another member of staff identifies the abuse they have the chance to whistleblow which since the Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998) the staff have the right not to suffer detrimentally or be fired as a result of disclosing the information. In the past it has been known that staff have been aware of abuse taking place however have not reported it due to not wanting to be known as a grass to the service and their employees. To ensure that new employees of health and social care services are suitable for the job role of caring for vulnerable adults they will require a CRB check which since October 2009 they are required to obtain an Enhanced check rather than the normal standard check. This allows the employer to be aware of the convictions to which these individuals applying for the job may have and therefore will be able to pick which potential employer is actually right for the job role in terms of offering greater protection to the service users. This however may not always go to plan due to the loop holes which can still be identified in cases such as in the Winterbourne View residential care home whereby Panorama went undercover after a whistleblower who previously worked at the care service alerted higher authorities with the management at the care home and to the Quality Care Commission however his claims didnt get followed up however after the programme was shown the Safeguarding Adults Board were made aware and appropriate action was taken in line with established and procedures which should have been followed by the staff members previously to prevent the abuse. The abuse in which was taken place could have been prevented through thorough training of the staff and ensuring they were up to date with these policies and procedures. Not only this however but the recruitment of the staff should also have been more carefully picked with staff members with job history of being a tattooist with no previous healthcare qualifications. In conclusion if the policies, procedures and guidelines were followed correctly and appropriate training was also implemented then the abuse that took place at Winterbourne View would have never happened. If the communication between the different services was also improved through a multi-agency working approach then the abuse could have been stopped a period of time before the Panorama programme.

Consumer vs Ewaste

Consumer vs Ewaste Free Online Research Papers CONSUMER VS E-WASTE : WHO’S GOING TO RUN THE SHOW This paper has been jointly authored by S SURESH KUMAR, a post graduate in computer science, and a research scholar employed with GoI alongwith Dr SP VICTOR Head of Department Director of Research Centre at St Xaviers College , Palayamkottai Tirunelveli both of whom instill great concern for nature. Keywords : WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipments, recycling technologies, MSW (Muncipal Solid Waste), BER (Beyond Economical Repairs) 1. ABSTRACT Recent growth in the electronics sector and rapid changes in technology mean that more and more consumers are generating growing volumes of WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipments), much of which is still operational. Faced with a limited and fragmented recycling and reuse infrastructure, many consumers are storing old equipment in their homes or discarding it with their regular trash as it turns out to be an easy option for them. This report attempts to explore as to who will overtake the other in the race between ‘consumer’ and ‘e-waste’ and also suggests that more workable solutions regarding safe disposal of e-waste are available so that e-waste don’t overrun the consumer in the long run. 2. OVERVIEW Processes and policies governing the reuse and recycling of electronic products need to be standardized worldwide to stem and reverse the growing problem of illegal and harmful e-waste processing practices currently followed in developing countries. Making appropriate recycling technologies available worldwide and standardizing government policy approaches to reuse and recycling could dramatically extend the life of many computers, mobile phones, TVs and similar products and allow for more complete end-of-life harvesting of the highly valuable metals and other components they contain. WEEE has been characterized as one of the fastest growing categories of Municipal Solid Waste (MSW). Though the actual volume of electronic waste generated in India is not tracked or cannot be tracked in view of the growing nature of illegal trade in e-waste. M/s Toxic Links an NGO based at New Delhi has made a pioneering effort to assess the quantity of e-waste generated in India. In addition to the large demand for natural resources that product turnover generates, the resulting electronic waste also precipitates a growing volume of toxic inputs to the local waste stream. If not contained, these toxic chemicals can come back to consumers and the public as air, food, and water contaminants. Consumer and environmental impacts of the equipment that is returned for recycling and reuse extend to its fate in the lesser developed countries of the world or to those countries where there are no stringent laws governing the e-waste. A substantial quantity of the equipment returned for recycling, more than half by some estimates may actually be exported for disposal in other countries where environmental and occupational health protections are weak and landfills are not properly controlled. Solving this important consumer and environmental challenge requires a better understanding of the current factors that drive high product obsolescence and replacement rates and of the limitations of existing consumer options to reuse and recycle electronics equipment. Current product design features and changes in technology and wireless services often make it difficult, if not impossible for consumers to avoid frequent replacements of functional electronics equipment. The benefits of technol ogical innovations must be accessible in ways that generate less waste and maximize product life expectancy and interoperability across the family of digital products and services that most consumers are using. Changes in business practices and government policies must aim to do the following: (a) Remove obstacles to equipment upgrades and repairs and develop quality and safety standards for refurbished products. (b) Enable consumers with information, tools and technical support to encourage and facilitate product upgrades and repairs, and to secure privacy for equipment reuse; and (c) Eliminate artificial drivers of product turnover and barriers to reuse such as hand set locks on cell phones and product designs that prevent battery replacement. Though consumer alternatives to sending retired equipment to landfills and incinerators have been growing, consumer awareness of electronic waste recycling options is low, and the infrastructure for reuse and recycling is highly fragmented, inconsistent, inconvenient, and often costly for consumers. However, because electronics recycling programs rarely track the actual fate of products returned for recycling or track it in a transparent manner, firm data on their impact are not available. Some electronic products are refurbished for resale, raising questions about the safety and quality of these goods and their impact on the waste stream in countries where they are sold. 3. HISTORY OF E-WASTE The global technological revolution is fueling the rapidly increasing e-waste recycling problem. As seen from the chart at Appendix ‘A’, one has to remember that with the growth in technology, the amount of e-waste generated also increases. The demand to effectively and safely recycle the obsolete electronics is pushed by the same demands our society imposes to manufacture the new, smaller, faster and more efficient software. The environmentally safe disposal of e-waste has rampantly become a problematic issue over the past decade. Technological advances and legislation at all levels has vaulted e-waste recycling into an evolving multi-billion dollar a year industry. The environmental concerns regarding e-waste stem from the many compounds that are known to have adverse impacts on the health of the environment and all living beings. The following hazardous elements and compounds can be found in everyday e-waste: (a) Lead in cathode ray tubes and solder (b) Mercury in switches and housing (c) Arsenic in older cathode ray tubes (d) Antimony trioxide as flame retardant (e) Polybrominated flame retardants in plastic casings, cables, and circuit boards (f) Selenium in circuit boards as power to supply rectifier (g) Cadmium in circuit boards and semiconductors (h) Chromium in steel as corrosion protection (i) Cobalt in steel for structural strength and magnetivity 4. MORE DISPOSAL CONCERNS As the quantity of e-waste generated increases with the growth in electronic industry, one has also to be concerned with its safe disposal in an environmentally friendly manner. In addition to the potential environmental damage and resulting penalties, the disposal of electronic waste carries with it the liability related not to what the equipment is made of, but to what it contains. From the chart at Appendix ‘B’, the growth of electronic goods market in India is clearly seen. As seen from the chart, it can be inferred that in view of the growth of electronic goods in India presumed to increase exponentially, the safe disposal of the same also need to be catered to in order to prevent the e-waste from overrunning the end user / consumer. For example companies disposing of old computers leave themselves open to the risk of unwanted data exposure if private client data or proprietary information is not properly removed from hard drives. Another concern for organizations disposing of technology is software license infringement. If a hard drive is not properly erased prior disposal, any software found on the computer can be recovered and used or sold, violating the software companies’ licensing agreements. The same thus leads to the commonly found e-waste management system currently in India which is as potrayed at Appendix ‘C’. It is also learnt from available records that considerably more equipment is shipped to China and other Asian nations apart from African countries, where it is dismantled under unsafe conditions, poisoning the local people, land, air and water. Currently, India imports roughly 280,000+ tons of e-waste annually and this is expected to double by the year 2013. Most of the e-waste that enters this country is done under illegal circumstances and much of it comes from developed nations such as the US, UK and Europe. Though most of these countries have laws prohibiting the export of e-waste it is generally relabeled and redirected in the name of charity organizations as working/donated computers and other electronic devices in order to pass through Customs and shipped off to buyer who is eagerly awaiting for its arrival at an underdeveloped nation. 5. MANAGING THE RISK Considering the various liability risks involved with the disposal of electronic waste, it is important for one to choose an e-waste disposition option that not only is environmentally compliant but also protects the interests of the individuals therein. For example manufacturers like Hewlett-Packard try to limit the risk of unpredictable outsourcing by doing the bulk of their recycling in-house and closely monitoring any of their partners. With e-waste becoming a more prevalent problem, it is important for both manufacturers and end users of electronic equipment to develop effective end-of-life disposition strategies. Failure to do so could mean severe consequences to irreparable damage to one’s own environment. 6. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS The end user is always left wondering to the fate of his returned electronic products. The same is summated as under in a nutshell. In India, let’s say that a Government Organisation ‘A’, wants to get rid of an unusable/obsolete FAX machine. The FAX machine is declared BER (Beyond Economical Repair) by a board of personnel who without any technical wherewithal sentence the EEE equipment (herein FAX machine) to its final disposal. The same is generally disposed off by auctioning to the highest bidder. With this the FAX machine is ‘struck off’ the Govt ledger and is thus ‘accounted’ in Govt records. Upon arrival at its destined location, it is then trucked to an area that unloads and disassembles the electronics for its valuable components which contain small amounts of gold, silver, copper, etc. The most common method of extracting these metals is burning of the PCB board under a hot open forced flame (generally 870 °C) where the worker is exposed to the heavy black smoke. The worker then removes the non usable components by use of various hand tools such as a hammer and chisel. The PCB board is then bathed in corrosive acids such as cyanide (mostly used to recover the gold). These chemicals, once used, are generally dumped on the open ground as there exists no processing plants in India to take care of this hazardous waste. The gold is then recovered and melted into bars for easy sale and distributed to various buyers. This gold is generally not 99.9% pure due to the process that is used to extract and thus is unregistered as directed by local and international laws. This gold contains many impurities lessening its value. This gold is used to make jewelry for sale locally on the open and underground market. NOTE: One metric tone of e-waste from personal computers contains more gold than recovered from 17 tons of gold ore. In 1998, the amount of gold recovered from e-waste was the same as recovered from 2 million tons of gold ore. This will keep the fl ow of e-waste flowing for years to come. This is only part of what is recovered. Other metals such as copper, silver and platinum are also recovered. Most of the methods used to recover these metals use acids that cannot be broken down at a common level and thus is disposed of improperly. Another example is of the PCB Recycling Machine which is no different as all of the e-waste (herein PCB) material is merely ground up into a powdery substance and the same chemical process is used however, at a faster rate and is less handled by humans. Still the same problem exists in the disposal of the hazardous chemicals; where to dump them? They generally end up in the sewer systems and open ground once they are used. Plastic coated copper wire is extracted with the same process, it is simply soaked in a very corrosive acid until the plastic melts away and the copper is recovered (and silver in many cases). The invention of the PCB Recycling Machine does nothing but increase the amount of output of the PCB boards and its metals in the form of powder. You are still left with a nightmare to clean this up but only at a faster pace. Thus these and various other problems thus adds to human woes. 7. RECYCLING STEPS IN INDIA A large number of informal markets striving on e-waste trade have been found to flourish in India. However, it has been seen that the following are the recycling steps that are most commonly seen amongst the formal as well as the informal recyclers. (a) Manual Dismantling: The accrued electronic and electric waste in India is dismantled and sorted manually to fractions which contain printed wiring boards (PWB), cathode ray tubes (CRT), cables, plastics, metals, condensers and other invaluable materials like batteries, LCDs or wood using chisel, hammer and other such crude methods. (b) Refining and Conditioning : The different e-waste fractions are processed to directly reusable components and to secondary raw materials in a variety of refining and conditioning processes viz acid baths etc. (c) Final Disposal: This is the most sought after option. Herein, the e-waste is disposed off in a municipal landfill which leaches into the ground water which thereafter serves as feed to fishes and which are in turn consumed by humans. 8. WHAT IS THE GOVT DOING According to research conducted by Greenpeace, Mumbai tops the country with around 50,000 tonne of e-waste every year. The figure is projected to increase to 3 lakh tonne per annum by 2011. Apart from that, the manner in which e-waste is presently being recycled is highly harmful for the environment and human health as well. Currently, the total e-waste generation in Mumbai and Pune is around 5 lakh metric tonne per annum. The present e-waste recycling in India is carried out in two steps dismantling and segregating. Recovery of valuable metals and resource recovery are not taking place. The reason for this is that resource recovery facility is available only in Belgium. The Indian Govt is in an all out effort towards early setup of the project for resource recovery which is expected to take shape by this year end at Mumbai. Thus, it is felt that the Indian Govt is channelizing all its resources in the meaningful direction so as to achieve a workable solution towards safe disposal of e-waste in an environmentally sound manner. 9. WAY AHEAD In order to ensure a harmonious relationship between the consumer and e-waste, the following course of action is recommended so as to ensure that e-waste does not get ahead of the consumer in the long run which can turn out to be disastrous to mankind. Within the overall aim of implementing a clean and transparent e-waste channel in India, one of the actions suggested is to assist the informal e-waste recyclers in reaching a formal status and in improving their process in terms of workers health and safety and emission control to the environment. Numerous training methods needs to be formulated such as training of trainers (ToT), a training of enterprises (ToE) and a follow-up period for implementing improvement measures. (a) Training of Trainers (ToT) : As a first step, a training of trainers (ToT) needs to be held with consultants from different backgrounds (NGOs, Industry, Academics). The objective should be to teach them to analyse a company’s process and identify improvement potentials. (b) Training of Enterprises (ToE) The next step after ToT should be the ToE. The objective should be to have the companies analyse their process themselves, with the help of the freshly trained trainers, and to identify themselves where improvements are possible. As trivial it may seem, it is not such an easy exercise for the recyclers to analyse in a rational way with the help of process flow charts and activity they have been doing for generations. Such an approach guaranties a full participation of the recyclers, instead of having external people telling them what to do. (c) Action Plan and Follow-Up This part is certainly the most important of the entire training program, and also the most expensive. Indeed, there will be many expectations that would have arisen during the ToT and ToE, and it is necessary to closely follow the target group in order to make sure that they effectively improve and find some benefit in doing so. Basically the action plan needs to focus on the following actions: (i) Door opening The door opening activity describes all necessary tasks to put the informal sector in relation with the relevant regulatory bodies they will have to interact with in order to become formal. Indeed, such groups have always been kept out (voluntarily or not) of the formal system, so that they need to be accompanied by the trainers for entering the formal world. The final objective is to figure out how to comply with requirements for obtaining Certificates for Establishment and Operation (CFE and CFO). (ii) State-of-the art facility One of the major issues that is expected to come out of the ToE is that especially the precious metal recyclers cannot continue to handle hazardous chemicals in a densely populated area. Therefore, a proper facility must be found. This involves a place connected to municipal water supply and sewage, energy supply etc. Since the present target group is not only made of precious metal recyclers, but also of scrap dealers and dismantlers, it is relevant to include the latter in the facility. (iii) Technical input This is the key issue of the entire training, as the main improvements concerning health, safety and environmental impacts are technical. The technical inputs mainly need to focus on the following: (ai) Personal protective equipment (PPE): Every stage of the recycling processes require specific protective equipment. The trainers task is to teach the recyclers which PPE to use for which process stage, how to use the equipment, how to dispose of it when unusable, where to purchase it. (aii) Emission control: Emission control consists of two main outputs to environment, namely acid fumes and effluent. Fumes must be controlled through a proper equipment, avoiding exposure to workers on the one hand, and on the other hand neutralizing the fumes before emitting them to the atmosphere. A strategy must be defined for effluents, whether they can be treated on site and dumped in the sewage, or be sent to a proper treatment facility. (aiii) Process improvement: Especially the precious metal recovery may be improved in its chemical process. Two objectives must be aimed at, namely improving the recovery yield and replacing hazardous inputs (e.g. Mercury, Cyanide) by less dangerous products. (aiv) Structural organisation of workshops: In general, whatever the process, all stages take place at the same site without differentiation. A plan should be designed to clearly separate the different steps, such as storage of material, storage of chemicals, operation area, cleaning of material etc. Also, book keeping of inputs and outputs of material and money should be organised. (av) Association building : The target groups need to be organised into some kind of formal body, which is the gateway to training programs and expert input. 10. CONCLUSION With the growth of electronic industry at a rampant pace, the author has researched whether the consumer or the e-waste will overgrow the other. The various e-waste recycling technologies known to mankind are in a nascent stage and needs to be dwelled upon by mankind in order to come up with a safe and sound e-waste recycling technology which is environmentally friendly and also safe to mankind. References 1. American Plastics Council, â€Å"An industry full of potential: Ten facts to know about plastics from consumer electronics-2003 update†. 2. Basel Action Network, Instructions for Qualifying for the Electronics Recyclers’ Pledge of True Stewardship, ban.org/pledge/Instructions%20for%20Qualifying.pdf. 3. Batista, Elisa, â€Å"Recycling? It’s Really Reselling† Wired News July 8. 2003.November 29, 2004 . 4. â€Å"Computers Shining Apple†, Consumer Report Dec 2004, p.41 5. Consumers Union, â€Å"Consumers Union Letter to the FCC – Handset Portability, March 11, 2004 6. â€Å"Moving to a New Computer,† Consumer Reports, March 2004. 7. Minnesota Office of Environmental Assistance, â€Å"Recycling Used Electronics Report on Minnesota’s Demonstration Project,† July, 2001. moea.state.mn.us 8. Northbridge Environmental Management Consultants, Characteristics of Massachusetts’ CRT Recycling Program. (October 21, 2002) 3-5, 3-16. 9. Puckett, Jim et all , â€Å"Exporting Harm:The High Tech Trashing of Asia† (The Basel Action Network and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, Feb 25, 2002) Appendix ‘A’ PROJECTED E-WASTE GENERATION Appendix ‘B’ GROWTH OF ELECTRONIC GOODS MARKET IN INDIA Appendix ‘C’ COMMONLY FOUND E-WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN INDIA Research Papers on Consumer vs EwasteOpen Architechture a white paperPETSTEL analysis of IndiaDefinition of Export QuotasMarketing of Lifeboy Soap A Unilever ProductGenetic EngineeringBionic Assembly System: A New Concept of SelfIncorporating Risk and Uncertainty Factor in CapitalRiordan Manufacturing Production PlanThe Effects of Illegal ImmigrationRelationship between Media Coverage and Social and

What are the implications of the beheading of Charles Research Proposal

What are the implications of the beheading of Charles - Research Proposal Example The conflict that ensured from the existence of these centers of power therefore, presented a threat to what the rule through divine right or great chain of being that the monarch alluded as the basis of the existence of their authority. One of the greatest implications of the beheading of king Charles in 1649 is that the action went against the great chain of being which creates the social hierarchy necessary for maintenance of social order. The great chain of being hypotheses has the king on top of a hierarchy also includes gentlemen and peasants in that order. Given that the England was a kingdom that had historically followed the absolutism form of rule; Charles as the king was facing great opposition from the parliament over his desire to use unlimited power in performance of his functions. The events leading up to the beheading is characterized by about ten years of civil strife and warfare with the King and the Long Parliament on opposing sides of the confrontation. The confrontation was over a litany of issues linked to the prerogatives of the King and the extent to which the constitutional parliament limited exercises certain powers and privileges1. Arguments on the basis of the great chain of being seek to assert the legitimacy of the king and his right to exercise powers over the people of the kingdom. The nobility during that time was a family perceived as appointed by God to rule over the rest in the kingdom and therefore had divine right to undertake their functions. Although Charles was not the first born in the family, the death of his elder brother meant that he was rightly the next in line to ascend to the kingdom. The legitimacy of the king therefore means the English civil war and the consequent defeat of the King Charles by the Parliamentarians (or the roundheads) led by Oliver Cromwell implies direct disregard of the hierarchy which had worked over the years to create

Advantages of open source software Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Advantages of open source software - Essay Example Today open source software has become critical for almost every organization.Almost everything requires open source software,be it telecommunication systems,inventory, accounting,personal productivity applications,contact management and operating systems amongst others.As far as the democracy peace and economy is concerned open software provides access to better technology to even those who cannot afford them. Since, technology is crucial to the economy in terms of the cost it saves by increasing the end productivity; the better access to technology has increased the productivity and thus the GDP of the entire world. Even cheaper technology is the success of most of the developing countries. The growth of the developing countries has provided better returns for the companies across the globe in-turn because they now have been able to easily get some part of their business outsourced to these destinations and decrease costs. This has lead to employing further more people and improving the technology further helping people across the world.The source code should be available with the software and distribution in terms of the compiled form should also be available. There should be a well publicized form of distributing the software just like distributing on the internet when the product is not distributed with the source code.There should be permission by the license for the distribution of software which is made from modified source code. The license needs to have derived works for having a distinct name or version number. 5. No Discrimination against Persons or Groups The license must not discriminate against any person or group of persons. It should be accessible to whoever wants. 6. No Discrimination against Fields of Endeavor The license must not restrict anyone from making use of the program in a specific field of endeavor. For example, it may not restrict the program from being used in a profit generation entity, or from being used for genetic research. 7. Distribution of License The rights attached to the program must apply to all to whom the program is redistributed without the need for execution of an additional license by those parties. 8. License Must Not Be Specific to a Product The rights attached to the program must not depend on the program's being part of a particular software distribution. If the program is extracted from that distribution and used or distributed within the terms of the program's license, all parties to whom the program is redistributed should have the same rights as those that are granted in conjunction with the original software distribution. 9. License Must Not Restrict Other Software The license must not place restrictions on other software that is distributed along with the licensed software. For example, the license must not insist that all other programs distributed on the same medium must be open-source software. 10. License Must Be Technology-Neutral No provision of the license may be predicated on any individual technology or style of interface. Following are the examples of open source software2: Linux (http://www.linux.org/): Originating from UNIX system and basically an operating system and kernel.

Jesus as an Imperialist Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Jesus as an Imperialist - Essay Example While considering the principles of Christianity for which he lived, an imperialistic approach has been adorned by him since his birth. He was looked for as king to be born in the dynasty of David who would free the Jews from the imperialism of the foreign governance and would establish the reign of God. The Jews believed that the promised man would appear on a Maundy Thursday and would take over as their king. However the consideration of Jesus as the king of Kings, involves a varied concept on imperialism. It never goes along with the conventional approaches of the worldly governing systems, but had a holy view adorning the power of Jesus as a king and the manifest destiny allied with his life and times. Zechariah 9: 9 says, â€Å"Rejoice greatly, daughter of Zion! Shout, daughter of Jerusalem! Behold, your king comes to you! He is righteous, and having salvation; lowly, and riding on a donkey, even on a colt, the foal of a donkey.†

Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance

Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Limited liability company structure is the most preferred structure for a large business. In this structure, a large number of investors provide the risk capital. They are called shareholders, the deemed owners of the company. They delegate the power to manage the company to board of directors. The board delegates the same to managers while retaining its role to monitor and control the executive management. Shareholders are viewed as the principal and the manager as their agents and this relationship is described as principal-agent relationship. The shareholders, of a widely held firm, practically do not have any control on the managers. They are only informed of the financial results on a periodical basis while the managers controls the firms assets. This structure provides an opportunity to the managers to expropriate shareholders wealth and misappropriate the funds by way of transfer of money as loans to his own companies, or sale of the company assets to themselves at a lesser pr ice or pay themselves more perks. The divergence of interest between the owners and the managers, due to the separation of ownership from control, results in the agency costs. It is not just separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers; but also the atomistic or diffused nature of corporate ownership, which is characterized by a large number of small shareholders. In such ownership structure, there is no incentive for any one owner to monitor corporate management, because the individual owner would bear the entire monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefits. Thus, both the magnitude and nature of agency problems are directly related to ownership structures. The fundamental theoretical basis of corporate governance is agency costs. The core of corporate governance is designing and putting in place disclosures, monitoring, oversight and corrective systems that can align the objectives of the shareholders and managers as closely as possible and hence, minimize agency costs. It deals with conducting the affairs of a company such that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of stakeholders. There are two kinds of mechanisms to overcome the agency problem and hence, improve corporate governance viz., the internal control mechanisms and the external control mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms are internal to the functioning of a company and broadly consist of the board composition, the board size, the leadership structure and the managerial compensation. External control mechanisms are the mechanisms that are external to the functioning of the firm over which the firm has no control. An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although the role that the institutional investors can play in the corporate governance system of a company is a controversial question and a subject of continuing debate. While some believe that the institutional investors must interfere in the corporate governance system of a company, others believe that these investors have other investment objectives to follow. The group of observers who believe that institutional investors need not play a role in the corporate governance system of a company, argue that the investment objectives and the compensation system in the institutional investing companies often discourage their active participation in the corporate governance system of the companies. Institutional investors are answerable to their investors the way the companies (in which they have invested) are answerable to their shareholders. And the shareholders do invest their funds with the institutional investors expecting higher returns. The primary responsibility of the instituti onal investors is therefore to invest the money of the investors in companies, which are expected to generate the maximum possible return rather than in companies with good corporate governance records. While the other group strongly believes that if the corporate governance system in the companies has to succeed then the institutional investors must play an active role in the entire process. By virtue of their large stockholdings, they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers, which can force them to focus more on corporate performance and less on self-serving behavior. Most of the reports on corporate governance have also emphasized the role that the institutional investors have to play in the entire system. Given the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets, it is not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. Activism by institutional investors has been both private and public, with the public activism being most visible in many countries. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. 7.2 Objectives of Study In light of the above discussion, the present study attempts to achieve the following objectives: To construct the corporate governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and corporate  governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance To establish relationship between corporate governance score and  firm performance In order to achieve the objectives stated above, the present study conceptualized the following null hypotheses for the validation of positive relationship between institutional holdings, corporate governance and firm performance 7.3 Hypotheses: H01: Institutional/its components Holdings and Corporate Governance score are  very closely related in a manner as to depict a positive relationship between  the two H02: Corporate Governance Score and Institutional/its components Holdings are  also very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship  between the two H03: Institutional/its components Holdings and various measures of firm  performance are very closely related in a manner as to depict  positive relationship between the two H04: Corporate Governance Score and various measures of firm performance  are very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship between  the two 7.4 The Sample Design and Data: To achieve the above objectives, a sample of 200 companies has been taken. The present study is based on the secondary data. It covers a period of five financial years from 1st April 2004 to 31st March 2008. Institutional holdings are further segregated into three constituents. The mutual funds being the first one. The second constituent includes various public and private sector banks, all the developmental financial institutions (like IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, SFC) and insurance companies like the LIC, GIC, and their subsidiaries. The last constituent comprise of foreign institutional investors. Data has been collected on the institutional holdings in total as well as on different constituents of institutional holdings from nseindia.com. The secondary data regarding annual reports to construct the corporate governance score have been collected from respective company websites and sebiedifar.com. . The firm performance measures have been divided into two categories, one being the accountin g measures while others are based on market returns. The accounting return measures include (%) return on networth, (%) return on capital employed, Profit After Tax, (%) Return on Assets, Net Profit Margin and Earning Per Share. Whereas, market return based measures include Tobins Q, (%) Risk Adjusted Excess Return and (%) Dividend Yield. Data for the study period on financial performance measures have been collected from Prowess Database. 7.5 Statistical Tools: Simple linear regression analysis has been used as a statistical tool to investigate the relationship between different variables. An attempt has been made to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. Data has been assembled on the variables of interest and employed regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. The study also typically assesses the statistical significance at 5 percent level of the estimated relationships, that is, the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the estimated relationship. Section A 7.6 Construction of Corporate Governance Score Review of Literature Some researchers have used board characteristics as an effective measure of corporate governance as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) have used board independence, Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) have used stock ownership of board members and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) have used the occupation of Chairman and CEO positions by the same or two different individuals. Whereas, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have constructed a governance measure comprising of an equally weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), such as, poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting, and supermajority rules to approve mergers. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) created an entrenchment index comprising of six provisions – four provisions that limit Shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult. While the above noted studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) used Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considered 51corporate governance features encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark. Standard and Poors provides a range of corporate governance analyses and services, the crux of which is the Corporate Governance Score. Corporate Governance Scores are based on an assessment of the qualitative aspects of corporate governance practices of a company. Information has been collected on the attributes from the latest available annual reports of sample companies. The methodology, with 98 questions in three categories and 12 sub-categories, is designed to balance the conflicting requirements of the range of issues analyzed and the tractability of the analysis. Transparency and Disclosure is evaluated by searching company annual reports for the 98  possible attributes broadly divided into the following three broad categories: Ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes) Financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes) Board and management structure and process (35 attributes) Resume Various researchers have considered alternate measures of corporate governance. Some of them have used single measure, while others have used the multiple measures in the form of indices. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark because two broad instruments that reduce agency costs and hence improve corporate governance are financial and non-financial disclosures and independent oversight of management. Improving the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures not only ensures corporate transparency among a wide group of investors, analysts and the informed intelligentsia, but also persuades companies to minimize value-destroying deviant behavior. This is precisely why law insists that companies prepare their audited annual accounts, and that these be provided to all shareholders is deposited with the Registrar of Companies. This is also why a good deal o f effort in global corporate governance reform has been directed to improve the quality and frequency of disclosures. Section B Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance: Review of Literature Coombes and Watson (2000) on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. . Denis and Denis (1994) found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996) provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite concl usions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Davis and Kim (2006) found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. Marsh (1997) has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007) examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger share holder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to go along with management decisions. Dahlquist et al. (2003) analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004) found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005) found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Leuz, Lins, and Wa rnock (2008) found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in three perspectives: Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition (2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance Score (dependent variable) (3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance Score (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment depict that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies with higher institutional holdings has increased where as the number of companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings has decreased over the study period. Hence, institutional holdings have shown an increasing trend of investment in the sampled companies over the study period. As far as the dynamics of components of institutional investors is concerned, no specific trend is observed in investments of mutual funds. On the other hand Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have shown declining trends of investments over the same period. Where as, foreign institutional investors have shown the increasing trends of investments in line with institutional holdings. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance state that the larger proportions of institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores in sampled companies and the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Thus, very strong and positive relationship is established between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Hence, H01 is accepted. The results outputs of the section analyzing the relationship between corporate governance score and institutional holdings describe that the companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of investments from institutional investors than the companies with lower governance scores. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and institutional holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. The inference can be drawn that institut ional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between mutual funds and corporate governance reveal out that smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher governance score in the sampled companies and larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is rejected. Alternatively, the results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between corporate governance and components of institutional holdings reveal out that the companies with lower governance scores have larger proportions of mutual funds holdings to the companies with higher governance scores over the study period. Hence, weak relationship also exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. Hence, H02 is rejected. It can be inferred from the above outcomes that mutual funds companies do not observe good governance practices in companies and simultaneously, good governed companies also do not attract higher mutual funds investments. The results outputs as to the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance depict that larger proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings have higher governance score and smaller proportions of holdings have lower governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is established between Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Similarly, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings to the companies with lower governance scores. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Hence, H02 is also accepted. The inference can be drawn on the basis of above results that Banks, FIs and ICs consider governance practices in companies while taking investment decision and alternatively, good governed companies also attract these investments. The results outputs pertaining to the relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance reveal out that the companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance score to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions of holdings. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is observed between FII holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Likewise, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have also larger proportions of Foreign Institutional Investors holdings. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and FII holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. It can be inferred on the basis of above result that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices and their investment do improve the governance practices in the companies. Resume The theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed evidence as to the relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Some of the studies put forth the evidence that corporate governance is the significant factor for institutional investment decision and their significant investment improve the governance practices in companies, while the other studies state otherwise. Where as the research findings of the present study further validate, support and enrich the literature on positive association between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Likewise, the studies provide inconclusive evidence as to the relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. But the findings of present study state that neither the mutual funds care about the governance practices of companies or their presence improve them. Similarly, the empirical literature provides indeterminate evidence on the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance. But the findings of present study observe very strong and positive relationship between the two. The empirical studies observe consistent results as to foreign institutional investors invest in better-governed companies but lacks evidence that their significant presence result in better governance. The findings of present study indicate that FIIs do not care for the corporate governance only, rather their higher stake ensure better governance too. Section C 7.8 Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance: Review of Literature Pound (1988) explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994) found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Han and Suk (1998) found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006) investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareh olders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1986) as well as Pounds (1988) theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Kno eber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in two perspectives: Institutional Holdings and Firm performance (b) Constituents of institutional holdings and Firm performance The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment indicate that there is no conclusive evidence as to larger proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have higher average return on networth or average net profit margin and smaller proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have lower average return on networth or average net profit margin over the study period. To the contrary, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and return on capital employed as well as institutional holdings and earning per share. As the average return on capital employed and average earning per share are higher in the sampled companies with higher proportions of institutional holdings and lower in the sampled companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. Therefore, it is stated that institutional holdings and two accounting returns (return on capital employed and earning per share) are significantly correlated where as institutional holdings and other two accounting returns (return on networth and net profit margin) are not related. Hence, there is no clear evidence that institutional holdings and accounting returns are related. Likewise, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and Tobins q. But on the other hand, weak relationship is observed between institutional holdings and risk adjusted excess return. Therefore, institutional holdings and one market-based return are significantly correlated while the institutional holdings and another market-based return are not. Thus, the findings depict contradictory results as to the relationship between institutional holdings and market Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Limited liability company structure is the most preferred structure for a large business. In this structure, a large number of investors provide the risk capital. They are called shareholders, the deemed owners of the company. They delegate the power to manage the company to board of directors. The board delegates the same to managers while retaining its role to monitor and control the executive management. Shareholders are viewed as the principal and the manager as their agents and this relationship is described as principal-agent relationship. The shareholders, of a widely held firm, practically do not have any control on the managers. They are only informed of the financial results on a periodical basis while the managers controls the firms assets. This structure provides an opportunity to the managers to expropriate shareholders wealth and misappropriate the funds by way of transfer of money as loans to his own companies, or sale of the company assets to themselves at a lesser pr ice or pay themselves more perks. The divergence of interest between the owners and the managers, due to the separation of ownership from control, results in the agency costs. It is not just separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers; but also the atomistic or diffused nature of corporate ownership, which is characterized by a large number of small shareholders. In such ownership structure, there is no incentive for any one owner to monitor corporate management, because the individual owner would bear the entire monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefits. Thus, both the magnitude and nature of agency problems are directly related to ownership structures. The fundamental theoretical basis of corporate governance is agency costs. The core of corporate governance is designing and putting in place disclosures, monitoring, oversight and corrective systems that can align the objectives of the shareholders and managers as closely as possible and hence, minimize agency costs. It deals with conducting the affairs of a company such that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of stakeholders. There are two kinds of mechanisms to overcome the agency problem and hence, improve corporate governance viz., the internal control mechanisms and the external control mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms are internal to the functioning of a company and broadly consist of the board composition, the board size, the leadership structure and the managerial compensation. External control mechanisms are the mechanisms that are external to the functioning of the firm over which the firm has no control. An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although the role that the institutional investors can play in the corporate governance system of a company is a controversial question and a subject of continuing debate. While some believe that the institutional investors must interfere in the corporate governance system of a company, others believe that these investors have other investment objectives to follow. The group of observers who believe that institutional investors need not play a role in the corporate governance system of a company, argue that the investment objectives and the compensation system in the institutional investing companies often discourage their active participation in the corporate governance system of the companies. Institutional investors are answerable to their investors the way the companies (in which they have invested) are answerable to their shareholders. And the shareholders do invest their funds with the institutional investors expecting higher returns. The primary responsibility of the instituti onal investors is therefore to invest the money of the investors in companies, which are expected to generate the maximum possible return rather than in companies with good corporate governance records. While the other group strongly believes that if the corporate governance system in the companies has to succeed then the institutional investors must play an active role in the entire process. By virtue of their large stockholdings, they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers, which can force them to focus more on corporate performance and less on self-serving behavior. Most of the reports on corporate governance have also emphasized the role that the institutional investors have to play in the entire system. Given the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets, it is not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. Activism by institutional investors has been both private and public, with the public activism being most visible in many countries. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. 7.2 Objectives of Study In light of the above discussion, the present study attempts to achieve the following objectives: To construct the corporate governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and corporate  governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance To establish relationship between corporate governance score and  firm performance In order to achieve the objectives stated above, the present study conceptualized the following null hypotheses for the validation of positive relationship between institutional holdings, corporate governance and firm performance 7.3 Hypotheses: H01: Institutional/its components Holdings and Corporate Governance score are  very closely related in a manner as to depict a positive relationship between  the two H02: Corporate Governance Score and Institutional/its components Holdings are  also very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship  between the two H03: Institutional/its components Holdings and various measures of firm  performance are very closely related in a manner as to depict  positive relationship between the two H04: Corporate Governance Score and various measures of firm performance  are very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship between  the two 7.4 The Sample Design and Data: To achieve the above objectives, a sample of 200 companies has been taken. The present study is based on the secondary data. It covers a period of five financial years from 1st April 2004 to 31st March 2008. Institutional holdings are further segregated into three constituents. The mutual funds being the first one. The second constituent includes various public and private sector banks, all the developmental financial institutions (like IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, SFC) and insurance companies like the LIC, GIC, and their subsidiaries. The last constituent comprise of foreign institutional investors. Data has been collected on the institutional holdings in total as well as on different constituents of institutional holdings from nseindia.com. The secondary data regarding annual reports to construct the corporate governance score have been collected from respective company websites and sebiedifar.com. . The firm performance measures have been divided into two categories, one being the accountin g measures while others are based on market returns. The accounting return measures include (%) return on networth, (%) return on capital employed, Profit After Tax, (%) Return on Assets, Net Profit Margin and Earning Per Share. Whereas, market return based measures include Tobins Q, (%) Risk Adjusted Excess Return and (%) Dividend Yield. Data for the study period on financial performance measures have been collected from Prowess Database. 7.5 Statistical Tools: Simple linear regression analysis has been used as a statistical tool to investigate the relationship between different variables. An attempt has been made to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. Data has been assembled on the variables of interest and employed regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. The study also typically assesses the statistical significance at 5 percent level of the estimated relationships, that is, the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the estimated relationship. Section A 7.6 Construction of Corporate Governance Score Review of Literature Some researchers have used board characteristics as an effective measure of corporate governance as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) have used board independence, Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) have used stock ownership of board members and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) have used the occupation of Chairman and CEO positions by the same or two different individuals. Whereas, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have constructed a governance measure comprising of an equally weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), such as, poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting, and supermajority rules to approve mergers. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) created an entrenchment index comprising of six provisions – four provisions that limit Shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult. While the above noted studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) used Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considered 51corporate governance features encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark. Standard and Poors provides a range of corporate governance analyses and services, the crux of which is the Corporate Governance Score. Corporate Governance Scores are based on an assessment of the qualitative aspects of corporate governance practices of a company. Information has been collected on the attributes from the latest available annual reports of sample companies. The methodology, with 98 questions in three categories and 12 sub-categories, is designed to balance the conflicting requirements of the range of issues analyzed and the tractability of the analysis. Transparency and Disclosure is evaluated by searching company annual reports for the 98  possible attributes broadly divided into the following three broad categories: Ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes) Financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes) Board and management structure and process (35 attributes) Resume Various researchers have considered alternate measures of corporate governance. Some of them have used single measure, while others have used the multiple measures in the form of indices. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark because two broad instruments that reduce agency costs and hence improve corporate governance are financial and non-financial disclosures and independent oversight of management. Improving the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures not only ensures corporate transparency among a wide group of investors, analysts and the informed intelligentsia, but also persuades companies to minimize value-destroying deviant behavior. This is precisely why law insists that companies prepare their audited annual accounts, and that these be provided to all shareholders is deposited with the Registrar of Companies. This is also why a good deal o f effort in global corporate governance reform has been directed to improve the quality and frequency of disclosures. Section B Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance: Review of Literature Coombes and Watson (2000) on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. . Denis and Denis (1994) found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996) provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite concl usions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Davis and Kim (2006) found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. Marsh (1997) has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007) examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger share holder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to go along with management decisions. Dahlquist et al. (2003) analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004) found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005) found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Leuz, Lins, and Wa rnock (2008) found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in three perspectives: Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition (2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance Score (dependent variable) (3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance Score (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment depict that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies with higher institutional holdings has increased where as the number of companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings has decreased over the study period. Hence, institutional holdings have shown an increasing trend of investment in the sampled companies over the study period. As far as the dynamics of components of institutional investors is concerned, no specific trend is observed in investments of mutual funds. On the other hand Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have shown declining trends of investments over the same period. Where as, foreign institutional investors have shown the increasing trends of investments in line with institutional holdings. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance state that the larger proportions of institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores in sampled companies and the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Thus, very strong and positive relationship is established between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Hence, H01 is accepted. The results outputs of the section analyzing the relationship between corporate governance score and institutional holdings describe that the companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of investments from institutional investors than the companies with lower governance scores. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and institutional holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. The inference can be drawn that institut ional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between mutual funds and corporate governance reveal out that smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher governance score in the sampled companies and larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is rejected. Alternatively, the results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between corporate governance and components of institutional holdings reveal out that the companies with lower governance scores have larger proportions of mutual funds holdings to the companies with higher governance scores over the study period. Hence, weak relationship also exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. Hence, H02 is rejected. It can be inferred from the above outcomes that mutual funds companies do not observe good governance practices in companies and simultaneously, good governed companies also do not attract higher mutual funds investments. The results outputs as to the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance depict that larger proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings have higher governance score and smaller proportions of holdings have lower governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is established between Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Similarly, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings to the companies with lower governance scores. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Hence, H02 is also accepted. The inference can be drawn on the basis of above results that Banks, FIs and ICs consider governance practices in companies while taking investment decision and alternatively, good governed companies also attract these investments. The results outputs pertaining to the relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance reveal out that the companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance score to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions of holdings. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is observed between FII holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Likewise, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have also larger proportions of Foreign Institutional Investors holdings. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and FII holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. It can be inferred on the basis of above result that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices and their investment do improve the governance practices in the companies. Resume The theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed evidence as to the relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Some of the studies put forth the evidence that corporate governance is the significant factor for institutional investment decision and their significant investment improve the governance practices in companies, while the other studies state otherwise. Where as the research findings of the present study further validate, support and enrich the literature on positive association between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Likewise, the studies provide inconclusive evidence as to the relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. But the findings of present study state that neither the mutual funds care about the governance practices of companies or their presence improve them. Similarly, the empirical literature provides indeterminate evidence on the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance. But the findings of present study observe very strong and positive relationship between the two. The empirical studies observe consistent results as to foreign institutional investors invest in better-governed companies but lacks evidence that their significant presence result in better governance. The findings of present study indicate that FIIs do not care for the corporate governance only, rather their higher stake ensure better governance too. Section C 7.8 Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance: Review of Literature Pound (1988) explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994) found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Han and Suk (1998) found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006) investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareh olders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1986) as well as Pounds (1988) theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Kno eber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in two perspectives: Institutional Holdings and Firm performance (b) Constituents of institutional holdings and Firm performance The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment indicate that there is no conclusive evidence as to larger proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have higher average return on networth or average net profit margin and smaller proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have lower average return on networth or average net profit margin over the study period. To the contrary, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and return on capital employed as well as institutional holdings and earning per share. As the average return on capital employed and average earning per share are higher in the sampled companies with higher proportions of institutional holdings and lower in the sampled companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. Therefore, it is stated that institutional holdings and two accounting returns (return on capital employed and earning per share) are significantly correlated where as institutional holdings and other two accounting returns (return on networth and net profit margin) are not related. Hence, there is no clear evidence that institutional holdings and accounting returns are related. Likewise, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and Tobins q. But on the other hand, weak relationship is observed between institutional holdings and risk adjusted excess return. Therefore, institutional holdings and one market-based return are significantly correlated while the institutional holdings and another market-based return are not. Thus, the findings depict contradictory results as to the relationship between institutional holdings and market